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DICKINSON LAW REVIEWL

RECENT CASES
TORT - NEGLIGENCE - ASSUMPTION OF RISK
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE - GOLFER DRIVING BALL WITHOUT WARNING

-

Is a golfer strictly liable for the safety of other golfers in his foursome? That
seems to be the contention of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Getz v. Freed.1
The pertinent facts of the case are as follows. After completing eighteen holes
of golf the litigants and two others decided to play a few more holes. The defendant, having th'e highest score on the eighteenth hole, was the last to drive on the
next hole. The defendant "hooked" his first drive over a low stone wall and out
of bounds at a spot thirty to thirty-five yards from the tee and thirty feet to the left
of the fairway. The defendant then, as is permitted by the rules of golf, hit a
second drive which rolled about forty yards from the tee into the fairway. The
plaintiff volunteered to look for and recover the defendant's first ball. The d'efendant turned on the tee' as if to walk over to his bag, and the plaintiff walked off
the tee to find the defendant's first ball. Just as the plaintiff reached a stone wall
which marked the out of bounds line he heard the words, "Look out, Charlie",
and was immediately hit on the back of the head by a ball which the defendant
had just hit from the tee.
As a defense, it was contended (1) that the plaintiff assumed the risks of
the game and (2) that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to watch alertly for the defendant's next shot. The court refused to charge
the jury on these points and the Supreme Court found this not to be error. It is submitted that the defendant was unduly prejudiced by the court's refusal to instruct
as to these defenses.
First, however, there must be negligence before there is need for a defense.
An interesting case on point is that of Houston v. Escott.2 In that case, the court
held that a golfer struck while not standing in the line of play by a ball driven by
a player assumed a risk of injury resulting from his own participation and could
not recover for injuries against such player. It is doubtful that anyone standing
near an out of bounds line a mere thirty-five yards from the tee could be considered
to be standing in the line of play. Under this case the defendant certainly would
not have been found to be negligent. The court in the principle case said:
"Defendant was undoubtedly guilty of negligence in driving a third
ball when his second drive was in the fairway, and he failed8 to warn the
rest of the foursome of his intention to hit a third drive."
This conclusion that the defendant was negligent is subject to examination.
The mere hitting of another ball certainly could not be considered a negligent act.
1 377 Pa. 480, 105 A.2d 102 (1954).
2 85 F.S. 59, (Del. 1949).
3 See n. 1, supra.
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The court said that the defendant violated a rule and custom of the game in hitting
this extra ball. The court is only half right with that statement. It is conceded that
a rule of the game was violated, but this rule is used merely to speed up the play
of the game and is not a rule of safety. Its violation, therefore, cannot be held to
be negligence. Where the court said a custom was violated they erred. They evidently failed to consider the "Mulligan Rule" which is an unofficial privilege to hit
another ball after hitting a bad shot, whether the ball landed in or out of bounds.
This is definitely a violation of a golf rule, but it is in general use among average
golfers. There is the failure to warn other players of the next drive as the only
possibility for finding negligence.
We now have to consider when a golfer has a duty to warn other golfers that
he is about to hit a ball. The court gives us a working standard in rule one of the
three generally known golf rules. This rule states that a golfer has a duty to give
timely and adequate warning of a shot which he has reasonable grounds to believe
may strike another. The word reasonable leaves us with a jury question. From the
facts of the case it was shown that the plaintiff was only thirty to thirty-five yards
from the tee and approximately thirty feet to the left of the fairway. The average
golfer would, I believe, give little thought to hitting a man standing in that position. In fact, that is probably further from the line of proposed flight of the ball
than the normal position taken by a caddie. It is customary for a caddie to move
out ahead of the tee to a good vantage point whenever there is a danger of losing
a ball. Such a position is usually along the edge of the fairway, but under the
facts of this case the caddie would most likely sit on the wall which formed the
parallel boundary. This would add to his own comfort and give him easy access
to any balls hit out of bounds. It has only. been since the professional caddies were
replaced by school boys during the war years that the bag carriers have started to
remain beside the tee while their golfers were teeing off.
It was held in Benjamin v. Nernberg4 that a golfer driving his ball towards
the green had no duty to warn a player in another foursome who was not standing
in the line of the golfer's play. In that same case it was held that a golfer was not
liable for making a poor shot, and that persons playing the game take all of the
usual risks that attend it. Surely being hit by a wild shot is one of the usual risks
of golf, whether the shot comes from the plaintiff's own group or from another
group nearby.
Biskup v. Hoffman5 held that there was a duty to call a warning to those on
the links in the direction of an intended shot, or in the actual course of the ball. The
qu'estion here is how far from the center of the fairway, which is normally the
direction of an intended shot, does this duty to warn 'extend? In the case of Alexander v. Wrenn6 a person was standing at an angle less than thirty-three degrees
from the line of intended flight, and the duty to warn was held to be a jury ques102 Pa. Super. 471, 157 Atd. 10 (1931).
220 Mo. App. 542, 287 S.W. 865 (1926).
6 158 Va. 486, 164 S.E. 715 (1932).
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tion. This seems to be an arbitrary figure without merit. The important element
to consider is the distance from the tee rather than the angle from th'e intended line
of flight. A solidly hit ball would travel at least twenty-five yards in a straight line
before the effects of a hook or slice would b'ecome noticeable. After the curve has
commenced, the angle from intended flight will rapidly increase with the continued flight of the ball. In other words, for the first twenty-five yards the angle
may be only one or two degrees from the intended line while at two hundred yards
the angle may have increased to forty degrees. It is obvious that a person standing
thirty-three degrees from the line of intended flight might easily be hit by a ball
at two hundred yards but might be very unlikely to be hit at ten yards.
The court in their rule number two said:
"A player assumes the risk or is guilty of contributory negligence
and want of due care if he intentionally or carel'essly walks ahead 7or stands
within the orbit of the shot of a person playing behind him".
It might seem that the court, in stating this rule, considers assumption of the
risk and contributory negligence to be one and the same. Prosser in his text recognizes these as two separate defenses. His rule of assumption of the risk is as follows:
"When the plaintiff enters voluntarily into a relation or situation
to assume the risk, and to reinvolving obvious danger, he may be taken
lieve the defendant of responsibility". 8
There are no facts in the present case which would take the plaintiff out of
the principle just stated. He voluntarily entered into the golf match knowing of
the danger of being hit by a wild shot. This danger was recognized by the court in
their opinion and such knowledge should be imputed to the plaintiff if not actually known. This is especially true since the plaintiff had previously played the
game. The litigants had just played eighteen holes together. This should be considered not only to show knowledge of inherent dangers of the game, but also
to show that the plaintiff should know of the defendant's negligent propensities.
How then is it possible to say that the plaintiff lacked knowledge when he entered
into the game? It appears therefore, that the defense of assumption of the risk
applies to the plaintiff.
Is it possible that the plaintiff might also be found to have been guilty of
contributory negligence? Prosser says, "His failure to exercise ordinary care to discover the danger is not properly a matter of assumption of risk, but of the defense
of contributory negligence." 9 According to the facts of this case, "Defendant
turned on the tee as if to walk over to his bag and plaintiff and his partner walked
off the tee to find defendant's first ball. Neither plaintiff nor his partner paid
any further attention to the defendant, but walked toward the boundary line.''10
There could be two possible actions taken by the defendant when he turned "as if
7
s
9
10

See n. 1, supra.
Prosser, Torts, p. 376, (1st ed. 1941).
Ibid., p. 386.
See n. 1, supra.
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to walk over to his bag". One, he could be going to pick up his bag and follow
the plaintiff off the tee, or two, he could be going to get a third ball out of his
bag to hit under the "Mulligan Rule". Under the facts of this case it appears that
two was the actual intent, unless it can be shown that the defendant carried two
extra balls in his pocket. If this was his habit, the plaintiff should have gained
knowledge of it from the previous eighteen holes. The plaintiff could have discovered his dangerous position, if it was actually dangerous, by merely turning his
head to see if the tee was clear. Instead, he paid no further attention to the defendant. Here, as well as with assumption of the risk, there is a question of the standard
of conduct of the plaintiff.
This question of standard of conduct is usually said to be a question of fact,
and should be a function of the jury in all doubtful cases. 1 It is only where the
judgment of reasonable men would not differ that the court will decide that a
person has or has not conformed to a particular standard. By refusing to charge
the jury on these two defenses, the court was saying, as a matter of law, that the
plaintiff was not contributorily negligent and that he did not assume any risk on
the golf course. It is submitted that the facts of this case leave enough doubt to
make reasonable men differ. It appears, therefore, that the court has encroached
upon the function of the jury in this case and prejudiced the defendant.
William McBride
Member of the Middler Class

TORT -

NEGLIGENCE

-

DUTY TO INVITEES

-

THROW RUGS

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in a recent decision, has embraced a
doctrine that is adhered to in some jurisdictions but not in Pennsylvania. This tact
situation pertained to unfastened throw rugs on polished floors.
In Brosor v. Sullivan,1 the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that where
an invitee falls and is injured on an unfastened rug which lies on a highly polished
floor, the question of negligence of a landowner who was aware of the condition
was one for the jury. The plaintiff's decedent was eighty-three years old, paid for
his room and board and was treated as one of the family. The defendant's wife and
the decedent had slipped on the rug previously and had, thereupon, warned the
defendant that the rug should be fixed. The rug laid on a highly polished floor in
front of the decedent's room, and it was necessary to pass over it in entering or leaving the room.
11 Prosser, op. cit. supra at p. 282.
109 A.2d 862, (1954).
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In the decision, the court was faced with two lines of thought on the subject
matter at hand and in opposition to the general rule of no liability said:
"A holding that the defendant was free from negligence as a matter
of law in this case would be tantamount to saying that which is dangerous
in fact is not dangerous in law and therefore we do not so hold. The
question of the defendant's negligence was properly submitted to the
jury.
The court also found that the decedent was not contributorily negligent as
a matter of law but that this was a question for the jury as well.
The case law of Pennsylvania is adverse to the decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In Cutro v. Scranton Medical Arts Bldg.,2 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held in effect that a landown'er was not liable as a matter of law
to an invitee who was injured from a fall on a throw rug resting on a polished
floor. In this case the defendant, who owned the office building, had leased a suite
of offices to five physicians. One of the offices was accessible only through a
hallway which was of polished hardwood construction, the polishing having been
done by the defendant in accordance with the lease. The throw rugs had been
placed in the hallway by the physicians. The wife of the plaintiff in using the
hallway to gain entrance to one of the offices, slipped, fell and was injured when
she stepped on one of the rugs in the hallway.
The plaintiff on appeal conceded that the maintenance of highly polished
floors by an owner of a building does not of itself constitute negligence in regard
to a guest or invitee who falls and is injured thereby, as stated in Gibbons v. Harris
Amusement Co.3 But the plaintiff charged that negligence in this instance was
the creation of a pitfall by concealing the highly polished floor beneath small
rugs in such a manner that the user was unaware of the dangerous condition.
The court disposed of this contention as follows:
"The presence of throw rugs on a polished floor is not negligence,
Gibbons v. Harris Amusement Co. supra .. " and "the practice of placing throw rugs upon polished floors is a general one, and only reasonable
care is required of the person stepping upon such rugs to avoid falls.
Here the plaintiff had ample opportunity to observe the condition and it
is not the fault of the defendant that she did not do so."
In conclusion, Pennsylvania case law holds that as a matter of law the owner
of a building is not liable to an invitee or guest who slips on a throw rug which
rests on a polished floor.
Karl E. Ringer
Member of the Junior Class

2 329 Pa. 382, 198 Atl. 141, (1938).

8 109 Pa. Super. 484, 167 At. 250, (1933).

